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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ARCH DAM CONSTRUCTORS,

Petitioner,
Case No.
9384

vs.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

PURPOSE FOR A REPLY BRIEF
Respondent's brief presented a legal argument unanticipated by Petitioner in that it asserted that the general public
may use a road as a matter of right against persons not claiming
any ownership interest in the land traversed by the road,
though the public has no right against the owner of the land,
and thus satisfy the definition of highway as contained in
Section 41-1-1 (bb), Utah Code Annotated ( 195 3), making
vehicles using such road subject to license and registration fees.
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It is in response to that argument that this reply brief addresses
itself.
ARGUMENT: PUBLIC USE OF A HIGHWAY nASA
MATTER OF RIGHT" MEANS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
AGAINST ONE HAVING AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST
IN THE LAND TRAVERSED BY THE HIGHWAY.
Respondent Tax Commission has admitted that the general
public does not use the access road as a matter of right against
the United States, who is the sole owner of the land traversed
by the access road, but argues that the general public has some
type of nright" against petitioner Arch Dam Constructors
which is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 41-1-1
(bb), Utah Code Annotated ( 195 3). This position is made
clear on page 5 of respondent's brief, where it is argued that:
nAppellant's recitation of statutes relative to the
acquisition of property rights or rights of use as against
the federal government is of no concern in this case.
It is true that the access road was not officially dedicated
to public use or abandoned to public use, but the
federal government itself has given the public a legally
enforceable claim against appellant by the terms of
Paragraph 48 of the contract between the Arch Dam
Constructors and the United States of America." (Emphasis added) .
The clear statutory requirement of a public use as a matter
of right is satisfied, according to respondent, if there is anyone
who cannot enjoin the public from using the access road. It is
immaterial, says respondent, whether the public has any right
against the owner of the land. Therefore, unless respondent
can sustain this argument, its entire case fails, for there is no
other claim of right in the public.
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No authority has been found anywhere which even intimates that a highway can be established by securing a ((right"
against someone who is not an owner of the land. Indeed, on
the contrary, all of the authorities are uniformly in accord in
declaring that a public right to use a highway is an interest in
the land which cannot be obstructed by the owner of the
servient estate. The following citations illustrate the concept
of a right in the public, and exhaustive citations to case authority
appear in the treatises cited to support the excerpts hereinafter
set forth:
((A highway is regarded as an easement and is regarded as an easement of perpetual character, and
therefore a freehold estate, or incorporeal hereditament.
It is an interest in land." 39 Corpus Juris Secundum,
Highways, Section 1, pages 910-11 (emphasis added).
(( ... the rights and title of an abutting owner who
owns the fee to the land over which a highway runs
are subject and subordinate to the easement and servitude in favor of the public." 25 Am. fur., Highways,
Section 136 (emphasis added).
C(The presumption is that the adjoining proprietors
on each side of a road own to its center. As such owners,
they have the exclusive right to the soil, subject only,
in general, to the easement or the right of passage in
the public and the incidental right of properly fitting
the way of use." Elliott, Roads and Streets, Vol. 2, Section 876, p. 1141 (emphasis added).
CtSubject only to the public easement, the proprietor
has all the usual rights and remedies of the owner of
a freehold." Elliott, Roads and Street, Vol. 2, Section
876.1, p. 1142 (emphasis added).
Accord: Elliott, Roads and Streets, Vol. 1, Sections 483-84.
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It is clear that the public never obtains any right to use a
highway unless and until there has been a Hdedication" to a
public use. A dedication is not necessarily a formal thing, for
the word is broad enough to include anything which gives
to the public a right of use:
"Dedication is the setting apart of land for the public
use. It is essential to every valid dedication that it should
conclude the owner, and that, as against the public,
it should be accepted by the proper local authorities
or by general public user. As will be more fully shown
hereafter, it is not necessary that the act of the owner
should be evidenced in any formal mode, nor that the
acceptance of the public should be evidenced by any
formal act. There are two general kinds of dedication:
1. Statutory Dedication. 2. Common-Law Dedication
"A distinguishing difference between a statutory and
common-law dedication is said to be that the former
operates by way of a grant, and the latter by way of
an estoppel in pais rather than by grant." Elliott, Roads
and Streets, Vol. 1, Sections 122, 125 (emphasis added).
Since the public right must be against the owner of the
land, and since the public right can only arise through some
form of dedication, it naturally follows that the dedication must
be by the owner of the land:
rrDedications can only be made by the owner. But
it has been held that the fact that part of the land
dedicated for a street does not belong to the dedicator
does not invalidate the dedication as to the part which
he does own. A person in possession without title
can not make an express dedication of the land so as
to bind the true owner. One of several tenants in common has no authority to make a dedication, nor can

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

one who has a mere equitable right of reversion."
Elliott, Roads and Streets, Vol. 1, Section 158 (emphasis added) .
And, obviously, a permissive use whereby the owner consents to public travel is not a dedication and no public right
is created:
ccThe intent essential to a valid dedication must be
to vest an easement, at least, in the public. Where
there is nothing more than a mere license there is no
dedication. Where the use is merely permissive, with
authority in the owner of the servient estate to put
an end to the use at his pleasure, there is no dedication;
nor, in such a case, are there such acts as will enable
the courts to infer an intent to dedicate. He who
claims against the owner of the fee an easement in
lands must show either a grant, a continued user for
twenty years [in Utah, ten years], or facts from which
an intent to dedicate the land can be fairly inferred."
Elliott, Roads a12d Streets, Vol. 1, Section 114 (emphasis added) .
ccA farmer may open a private road from one public
highway to another across his farm, which will accommodate, not only himself, but all who choose to travel
that way. His permission to the general public to travel
that way is not an act hostile to his title or to his right
to close the road at any time. So, a manufacturer may
establish his plant in the center of his lands, and open
a road to the public highway upon either side, and
permit the public to use it, and merchants and peddlers
to travel it, carrying their goods to the houses owned
by him and occupied by his employees and tenants. But
such use is permissive, and gives the public no permanent rights in it as a highway. So a mining corporation, as is often the case, constructs roads from the
public highways in, over, and around its mine, built
and kept in repair by the company, and permits the
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public the free use of them. But this does not make
them public highways within the meaning of the
statute. Such permissive or invited use is not that use
contemplated by the statute which will convert a private
road into a public highway." Stickley v. Sodus Township, 131 Mich. 510, 91 N.W. 745, 59 L.R.A. 287.
The Utah statutes are not only clear to the effect that if
the public cannot assert a right against the owner, the road is
simply a private one, but the statutes also declare that a permissive use does not create rights in the public:
f(Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent
the owner of real property used by the public for purposes of vehicular travel by permission of the owner
and not as a matter of right from prohibiting such use,
or from requiring other or different or additional conditions than those specified in this act, or otherwise
regulating such use as may seem best to such owner."
Section 41-6-18, Utah Code Annotated {1953) (emphasis added) .
((Every way or place in private ownership and used
for vehicular travel by the owner, and those having
express or implied permission from the owner, but not
by other persons" is a private road. Section 41-6-7,
Utah Code Annotated {1953) (emphasis added).
Petitioner Arch Dam Constructors is a contractor doing
work for the United States upon land wholly owned by the
United States. We readily admit that petiioner cannot enjoin
the general public from using the access road, not only because
the construction contract so provides, but, more fundamentally,
because petitioner has no ownership interest whatever in the
land traversed by the road, and is in no position to say who
can or can't use a road belonging to someone else.
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Respondent seems to contend that the "right" in the
public to use the access road is a contractual right which the
public derived as a third party beneficiary to the construction
contract between petitioner and the United States of America.
But this is difficult to perceive. Petitioner had no interest in
the land and could in no way promise an easement or right
in the public, and did not attempt to do so, but merely recited
that it would not interfere with public travel (Para. 40a, Ex.
A) . The United States, as the owner of the land, did not
promise any easement or right in the public, and, indeed, if
it had attempted to do so, such an attempt would have been
futile, for Congress has given no authorization for creating
such rights in the public through such a contract (petitioner's
brief, pp. 13-28). The only thing the contract did was to
recite that the United States owned the road, that the general
public was being permitted to use it, that the contractor could
use the road while performing the work, and that the contractor should not imperil the use of the road by the public.
No argument is made by respondent that the public has any
rights against the United States, and, as stated above, the
petitioner had no property rights or interests in the land or
road to convey to the public or anyone else, even if it had
attempted to do so.
Quite frankly, it appears that the argument of respondent
is a bit too obtuse to lend itself to any rational application. We fail to see how anyone can use any land as a
matter of right against someone who claims absolutely no
ownership interest in the land.
It would appear that if the general public has a uright"
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to use the road as against petitioner, then the public likewise
has a similar C(right" to use the road against all other parties
who have no ownership interest in the land traversed by the
road. For example, following this logic, we are forced to conclude that the general public uses the access road in Daggett
County as a ccmatter of right" against the State of Florida,
Weber County, and all the farmers in Tooele County. But,
of course, this is ridiculous, since such a ccright" against those
having no interest in the land is no right at all, and certainly
does not change a private road to a public road. The only
legitimate question is what right does the public have against
the United States, who is the owner of the road.
Simple examples, indistinguishable from the present case,
further highlight the untenable position set forth by respondent.
Suppose the owner of a farm permits the general public to
cross his land with their vehicles. Then, one day, the farmer
hires a contractor to dig some new ditches on his farm, but
instructs the contractor not to obstruct the road because the
farmer is permitting the public to use the road. Under the
rationale of respondent, this simple instruction by the farmer
has the magical effect of transforming a private road owned
by the farmer into a public highway which the public uses
as a matter of right-not because the public has any right
against the owner, but because the public has some type of
ccright" against the contractor digging the ditches.
Or, suppose that a trespasser continually walks across
the back yard of X. The neighbors cannot complain nor can
they en join the trespasser from walking across the yard of X.
Yet, since the trespasser cannot be enjoined by the neighbors
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of X from crossing the land of X, the trespasser can therefore
walk across the property of X as a matter of right. Not as a
matter of right against X, of course, but as a matter of right
against the neighbors of X, who have no ownership interest
in the yard of X. We fail to visualize what type of right this
could be, but respondent says it is sufficient to transform a
private road into a public highway.

CONCLUSION
Failing to find even a pretense of a right in the public
against the United States to use the access road, respondent
has argued that it is a sufficient right if the contractor, petitioner
herein, cannot legally en join the public from using the access
road. Legal authority is undivided and unambiguous in declaring that a matter of right means a right against the owner
of the land. There is not the slightest authority, in Utah or
elsewhere, to sustain the contention urged by respondent. The
access road is nothing mo~e than a private road, owned by
the United States and used by the public at the grace of the
United States, and respondent Tax Commission is wholly without authority to compel petitioner to register and license vehicles
used exclusively upon the access road.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE & MECHAM
By: EDWARD W. CLYDE
- RICHARD L. DEWSNUP
Attorneys for Petitioner
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